Jackson Kang

7/31/21

Cavendish’s motion argument argues the point that the mind is material through four premises, consisting of (1) the mind moves; (2) In order for anything x to move, x must be in space; (3) therefore, the mind must be in space; (4) if the mind is spatial, the mind is material. All of these premises conclude that the mind is material. Cavendish supports premise one because she thinks that the mind and body move as a unit, so naturally, whenever the body moves, the mind must follow it. Premise two essentially states that anything that moves has to be in, or take up, space in order to move. Cavendish supports this premise because she believes that there can only be physical motion and no immaterial motion (when immaterial objects move). Premise three states that the mind is in space: this conclusion is derived from premise one and two. Cavendish states that since the mind moves, and anything that moves is in space, the mind must be in space. Premise four states that the mind is material if spatial: Cavendish believes if an object is spatial or takes up any kind of space, then it must be a physical object and material matter, leading to the conclusion that the mind is material. While Cavendish’s motion argument is certainly valid, its soundness is debatable. Despite objections to Cavendish’s motion argument, one has many reasons to think that Cavendish’s motion argument is sound.

Cavendish’s motion argument, however, is still susceptible to objections from those who believe immaterial motion exists, and therefore premise two of the motion argument is false. Cavendish states that “though Matter might be without motion, yet motion cannot be without matter; for it is impossible that there should be an immaterial motion in Nature”, as her explanation for not believing in immaterial motion: in other words, Cavendish believes that it is impossible for objects that have no physical form to move. However, one can argue that immaterial objects can move, and such matter exists yet is primitive and will be discovered in the future. For instance, in the future a scientist would discover a type of “dark matter” that would have no properties of matter, but would still be present and moving nevertheless. Such a “dark matter” would prove immaterial motion exists, and that cavendish’s argument is unsound. Cavendish would likely respond to the “dark matter” objection by stating that scientists would not be able to discover this “dark matter” in the first place without the “dark matter” having some physical property of matter; or in other words, it would be impossible to discover/detect such a substance without it having some physical property.

In conclusion, Margaret Cavendish’s Motion Argument is sound and thoroughly supports the belief that the mind is a material substance. Cavendish’s premises and conclusion were proven to be sound and her response to the dark matter objection provides evidence as to why the mind is material.