Richard Feldman’s New Demon’s Objection is an argument put together in order to disprove Process Reliabilism through its premises. Feldman’s objection to Process Reliabilism has led to many Process Reliabilists themselves coming up with counter objection to Feldman’s scenarios; however, before we divulge into these counter objections to Feldman, Feldman’s objection itself must be explained, along with other key details.

Brian/ Brain Objection + Why Feldman believes in his premises:

Feldman offers a modernized version of the New Demons account, which I will dub the “Brian/Brain Objection”. This Objection moves to the same conclusion as the New Demons Objection, process reliabilism is false, but utilizes a different situation. However, before we dive into the argument, a couple of terms need to be clarified. BIV refers to a “brain in a vat”, which essentially is a brain in a vat whose mental procedures are controlled by scientists and are computer generated; PR is just the shortened version of process reliabilism, and is the view that a person is justified in believing something if that thing is produced by reliable, belief-forming processes. We are now ready to view the simple version of the argument, and Feldman’s lengthy explanation for the arguments’ premises.

The Simple version of the argument follows this structure:

1. The BIV has justified but false beliefs about the external world
2. The BIV couldn’t have justified but false beliefs about the external world if PR is true
3. Therefore, PR is false.

Feldman further elaborates on his premises with a drawn out example of the Brian/Brain objection, clarifying the objection as well as showcasing why Feldman himself believes his premises.