Feldman’s Response to the PR-ist’s Objection to the Brian/Brain Scenario:

Feldman, being the good prompt epistemologist that he is, would respond to the PR-ist’s two objections with more scenarios of his own. Feldman would respond to the PR-ist’s first objection (Brain doesn’t have justification) by stating that the BIV would have justification for their beliefs since they still perceive experiences as if they are real humans. The BIV still receives the artificial signals that makes the BIV think that it’s perceiving true experiences, and there is nothing else that would prove otherwise: the definition of a BIV itself states that the BIV itself thinks it is living a perfectly normal life, regardless of if it mirrors the experiences of another individual. In other words, the BIV does have its own consciousness, unlike the “puppet” state that the PR-ist is suggesting: therefore, the BIV does have justification based on its experiences. However, Feldman would most likely respond a bit differently in regards to the PR-ist’s second objection, instead simply stating that Brian would never have a justification for being a BIV in the first place: the notion of someone having justification for believing that they are a BIV is very unlikely and close to impossible, as there has yet to be any sort of evidence pointing to that matter. Feldman would argue that the event in which we figure out whether we are BIVs is when we will learn what God is.