In recent years, the debate surrounding free will and determinism has grown more relevant, impacting how we view human rights. As scientific advancements continue to reveal the intricate causes behind human behavior—be it through biology, genetics, or neurology—the question arises: if human actions are predetermined, what does this mean for the very concept of human rights?

Determinism and the Illusion of Choice

Scientific determinism posits that all events, including human actions, are determined by preceding causes. Essentially, every choice we make is influenced by our genetic makeup, upbringing, and environmental factors. If true, this would challenge the deeply ingrained belief that individuals have “free will.” Instead of acting out of genuine autonomy, we may merely be executing a set of pre-existing conditions.

This concept feels at odds with the structure of human rights. At their core, human rights are built on the presumption that individuals are responsible for their actions and deserving of dignity, respect, and autonomy. But if people lack true autonomy, how does one argue that they “deserve” anything?

Human Rights as a Reflection of Moral Autonomy

In Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, Immanuel Kant argues for a form of human dignity that doesn’t depend on external conditions. He claims that moral agency, or the ability to make ethical decisions, is what grants human beings an inherent worth. Kant’s framework assumes autonomy—an idea that clashes with scientific determinism. If people are predetermined to act as they do, how can we hold them to moral standards?

In Kantian terms, human rights are essential because they are anchored in our status as autonomous moral agents. But what if autonomy is an illusion?